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AMERICAN ORGANIZATION FOR PROSECUTION
OF GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS
By WiL LI F. FRATCHER*
I. Background. In the Ancient World the adage, "All's fair in love
and war," was all too literally true. The Roman conquerors of Carthage
massacred or enslaved its citizens and sowed its fields with salt. The hordes
of Genghis Khan indulged in such plunder, pillage arnd torture as they saw
fit. Tamerlane took pride in erecting pyramids of the skulls of the inhabi-
tants of cities which he captured. Warfare was cruel enough in the Middle
Ages but the Mediaeval Church had some success in creating rules for the
conduct of war as well as love. The attempt to introduce a modicum of
humanity into the essentially inhumane activity of war resulted in the
gradual development of a sort of international "common law of war"' or
customs governing the conduct of warfare. The primary principle of this
customary law of war is that "all such kinds and degrees of violence as are
not necessary for the overpowering of the opponent should not be per-
mitted."2 Beside this principle there grew one, perhaps deriving its inspira-
tion from mediaeval chivalry, that war should be conducted only by bel-
ligerents dearly distinguished from the general populace by distinctive cos-
tume and special discipline. From these principles sprang rules prohibiting
warfare against the non-combatant population, cruelty to the wounded, and
maltreatment of combatants who have been taken prisoner. The classic
statement of the laws and customs of war was made in General Order No. 100,
prepared by Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia College and promulgated
by the United States War Department on April 14, 1863. This statement
received general approval in other countries and most of its provisions have
been embodied in treaties adhered to by the major nations, notably the
"Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" annexed
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri; formerly Lieutenant
Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Army, and Chief,
War Crimes Branch, Legal Division, Office of Military Government for Germany
(U. S.).
1. Ex parte Vallandigham, I Wall. 243, 249 (1863).
2. 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 67 (1906).
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to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 19073 and the Geneva Conventions of
1929 regulating the treatment of the wounded and of prisoners of war.-
Concurrently with general acceptance of rules governing the conduct
of warfare there arose a well-'recognized practice of enforcement under which
any belligerent power with custody of a violator of the laws of war, whether
a member of its own or the enemy forces, might try him by a military
tribunal composed of officers of its service and impose death or any less
punishment. Since 1847 the United States has normally tried members of
the enemy forces for violations of the laws of war by military commissions,
which are boards of officers organized similarly to courts-martial but not
-bound by all the rules of court-martial prcedure. The legality of trials by
military commission was questioned by the then Judge Advocate of the
Army at the outbreak of the Civil War' but such trials were conducted on
a number of occasions during that conflct. For example, Captain Henry
Wirz, the Confederate commandant of Andersonville Prison, was tried by
military commission for maltreatment of Union prisoners of war0 and Cap-
tain Robert C. Kennedy, C. S. A., was tried for entering the Union lines in
disguise and attempting to set fire to the City of New York.7 The legality,
so far as American domestic law is concerned, of trial of enemy violators of
the laws of war by military commission has been firmly established by deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States.8
During World War I much public indignation was aroused in Allied
and Associated countries by reports of German barbarism in the treatment
of inhabitants of occupied Belgium and in the conduct of submarine war-
fare. The Preliminary Peace Conference appointed a commission to inquire
into and report upon (1) the responsibility of the authors of the war; (2)
the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of wir by the forces of the
German Empire and its allies; (3) the degree of responsibility for these of-
fenses attaching to particular members of the enemy forces; and (4) the
constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these
3. 32 STAT. 1803 (1899); 36 STAT. 2277 (1907).
4. 47 STAT. 2074 (1929); 47 STAT. 2021 (1929).
5. Case of Col. Ebenezer Magofln, C.S.A., 1 MS Op JAG, p. 285. See
Fratcher, Notes on the History of the Judge Advocate Generai's Department, 1
JuDGE ADv. JL. 5, 7 (1944).
6. See Annex II to Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 Am. J. IT'L L., 95,
142 (1920).
7. G. 0. No. 24, Dept. of the East, Mar. 20, 1865.
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offenses. The American members of the commission were Secretary of State
Lansing and Major James Brown Scott, formerly Professor of Law at Colum-
bia University. This commission rendered a report on March 29, 1919
finding that all enemy persons guilty of offenses against the laws and customs
of war or the laws of huanity, are liable to criminal prosecution, and recom-
mending the creation of an international "high tribunal" to try the principal
malefactors., The American members dissented from the findings and rec-
ommendations insofar as they related to offenses against the "laws of hu-
manity," the criminal responsibility of heads of states, and the creation of an
international high tribunal. ° The Treaty of Versailles, as finally adopted
by the Peace Conference, contained four articles relative to the punishment
of German war criminals." Article 227 provided for the trial of the former
German Emperor by a special international tribunal for "a supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." By article 228
the German Government recognized the right of the Allied and Associated
Powers to try violators of the laws and customs of war and agreed to deliver
up persons charged with such violations and by Article 230 the German
Government agreed to furnish such documentary evidence as might be
required. Article 229 provided that persons guilty of crimes against the
nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers would be brought to
trial before military tribunals of that power; those guilty of crimes against
the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers would
be tried by "military tribunals composed of members of the military
tribunals of the Powers concerned." Needless to say, the Kaiser was not
tried. The project of trial of lesser malefactors by Allied military tribunals
was dropped and the German Government was permitted to try the Ger-
man war criminals before the German Supreme Court at Leipzig. Of some
900 persons accused of serious offenses only twelve were actually tried and
but six convicted. Their sentences were unduly light and the two with the
heaviest sentences soon escaped from German jails, probably with the con-
nivance of German officials.12 The result of this experiment did not suggest
the desirability of repeating it after World War II.
9. Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 117, 123 (1920).
10. Ibid., Annex II, pp. 127-151.
11. 13 AM. J. IN'L L. Supp. 151, 250-251 (1919).
12. See Glueck, By What Ttibun a Shall War Offenders be Tried?, 24 NsR.
L. REv. 143, 144 (1945).
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II. The United Nations War Crimes Comrmission. On October 25,
1941 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill made simultaneous
statements condemning acts of barbarity being committed by Germans, Mr.
Churchill saying that "Retribution for these crimes must henceforward
take its place among the major purposes of the war." In notes of November
27, 1941 and January 6, 1942 Commissar Molotov warned that the German
crimes were being noted and registered, and would be punished. The gov-
ernments in exile of the nine occupied European countries participated in
a conference in London which adopted on January 13, 1942 the Declaration
of St. James's Palace, denouncing the German institution in the occupied
countries of a regime of terror characterized by imprisonments, mass ex-
pulsions, execution of hostages and massacre,*and affirming their determina-
tion to see that those guilty and responsible were tried and punished. Presi-
dent Roosevelt endorsed the Declaration in a statement of August 21, 1942,
Prime Minister.Churchill concurred on September 8, 1942 and the Soviet
Government accepted the principles announced in the Declaration by a note
of October 14, 1942. On October 7, 1942 President Roosevelt and the Lord
Chancellor, Viscount Simon, announced simultaneously that, after consulta-
tion with the other Allied Governments concerned, the two Governments
had decided to propose the creation of a United Nations Commission for the
Investigation of War Crimes. The commission was actually set up, under
the name of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, on October 20,
1943. It consists of sixteen members, representing Australia, Belgium, Can-
ada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the United States
and Yugoslavia. The meetings are held at London and a small secretariat
is maintained there. Sir Cecil Hurst, Vice-President of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and representative of Great Britain, was Chairman
of the Commission until January 1945, since which date Lord Wright of
Durley, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and the Australian representative on
the Commission, has served as chairman. 13 President Roosevelt appointed
the Honorable Herbert Claiborne Pell, former American Minister to Portugal
and Hungary, as the first American representative on the Commission but he
was soon succeeded by Colonel Joseph V. Hodgson, Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department, a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School
who had served before the war as Attorney General of the Territory of
13. See Glueck, The N-uernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. Rv.
396, 419 (1946); Bathurst, The United Nations War Crimes Commission, 39 Am.
J. INt L. 565 (1945).
[Vol. 1
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Hawaii. Colonel Hodgson was replaced in May 1946 by Colonel Robert M.
Springer, a graduate of the University of California School of Jurisprudence
and a career officer of the judge Advocate General's Department. 4
On the day that the United Nations War Crimes Commission was or-
ganized in London a conference of the foreign ministers of the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was in progress in Mos-
cow. On October 30, 1943 the conferees agreed to a declaration which was
issued three days later in the name of their three governments and in the
interests of the 32 United Nations. This Moscow Declaration became a,
sort of charter and guide for the United Nations War Crimes Commission.
The declaration recited that the Hitlerite forces had committed atrocities,
massacres and cold-blooded executions in many of the countries which they
had overrun, declared that "in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns
are redoubling their ruthless cruelties," and pronounced solemn warning
that, on the conclusion of an armistice with Germany,
"those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party
who have been responsible for or taken a consenting part in the
above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back to the
countries in which their abominable deeds were done, so that they
may be judged and punished according to the laws of those liberated
countries and of the free Governments which will be erected in
them.
"Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all those
countries, especially the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, Poland,
Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, including Crete and other is-
lands, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
France and Italy...."
The Moscow Declaration concluded with a paragraph which, as will be
pointed out, became of considerable significance two years later:
"The above declaration is without prejudice to- the case of
German criminals whose offences have no particular geographical
location, and who will be punished by joint decision of the Govern-
ments of the Allies."'"
On the recommendation of the United Nations War Crimes Commis-
sion each of the member nations set up a national war crimes office to collect
complaints of war crimes from its citizens and forward them to the commis-
14. 9 DEP'T STATE BULL. 3 (1943); 14 DEP'T STATE BULL. 8F5 (1946).
15. Barry, The Moscow Declaration on War Climes, 17 AUST. L. J. 248
(1943).
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sion.'6 The commission has considered such complaints, determined whether
the acts complained of constituted war crimes, and published lists of the
alleged war criminals, as contemplated by the Moscow Declaration. These
printed lists were supplied to the Allied troop commanders during combat
and to the occupation authorities in Germany thereafter, to enable them
to apprehend the wanted criminals. Incident to its principal task of con-
sidering complaints of war crimes and publishing lists of alleged war crim-
inals, the United Nations War Crimes Commission has conducted research
into the law governing war crimes and their punishment, discussed the
problems of law, morality and internationil policy involved, and published
a number of papers on various aspects of the subject, representing the con-
sidered collective view of the member nations. It has recently begun pub-
lication of reports of important trials of war criminals. The Commission
expects to complete'its mission by July 1, 1948.
American sponsorship of, and participation in, the work of the United
Nations War Crimes -Commission has been of much greater value than the
mere compilation of printed lists of war criminals would indicate. The com-
mission has provided a forum in which the smaller nations could express their
views and so give the benefit of the work, knowledge and thought of their
legal scholars to the major powers. It has, moreover, provided the major
powers with the moral support of all the member nations in reaching deci-
sions on-questions of policy and in the actual trial and punishment of war
criminals.
III. Over-All American, Organization in Germany.-When an Anglo-
American invasion of the European continent from the north was decided
upon the expedition was placed under the command of General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, United States Army. Control of the forces was exercised through
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, commonly known as
SHAEF; a combined staff composed of equal numbers of American and
British officers. The SHAEF staff section charged with planning the occu-
pation and military government of Germany was the German Country Unit,
headed by Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, Jr., Army of the
United States, which was organized at Cheltenham, England, in 1943 and
later moved to Versailles and Barbizon, France. The Legal Division of the
16. The United States office was established at Washington. It was headed
initially by Brigadier, General John M. Weir and later by Colonel David Marcus,
theretofore Secretary-General of the Office of Military Government for Germany(U. S.). Both were career officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department.
(Vol. 13
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German Country Unit, directed by Colonel John B. Marsh of the New York
Bar, was charged with planning for the apprehension, trial and punishment
of war criminals.
The German Country Unit was strictly a planning agency, without
operational responsibility. Throughout the combat period all operations of
military government and prosecution of war criminals were carried out by
the troop commands in the field. At the close of hostilities the major ground
force trooop commands operating under SHAEF were three army groups,
one under British command and two under American command, and, the
French First Army. The American Sixth and Twelfth Army Group head-
quarters exercised command over constituent field armies. Each field army
was composed of two or more army corps and these in turn were made up
of divisions. The staff of each army group, army, corps and division head-
quarters contained a civil affairs section, charged with the conduct of mili-
tary government and other problems incident to control of the German
civilian. population. The staff of each headquarters also had a judge advo-
cate section whose head was the chief legal officer of the command and
which supervised the operation of courts-martial and military commissions.
As seen at that time the war crimes problem involved primarily the trial
by'military commission of members of the German armed forces for viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war. It did not appear to have much
relation to the civilian population and did not include offenses against the
newly-established military government. In consequence the judge advocate
sections seemed the logical and appropriate agencies to handle war crimes.
As the military situation became static the staff judge advocates of the two
American army groups set up war crimes branches in their offices. The
Twelfth Army Group came to include the bulk of the American ground forces
in Germany and its judge advocate section, headed by Colonel Claude B.
Mickelwait, a graduate of the University of California School of Jurispru-
dence and a career officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department,
naturally became the chief war crimes operating agency of the American
forces.
By the summer of 1945 the combat phase of the ivar was over. SHAEF
and the American army group headquarters were dissolved and command
of the American forces in Germany was assumed by a new organization,
Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, commonly known
as USFET, centered at Frankfurt am* Main and headed by General Eisen-
hower. Initially the civil affairs division of USFET took over the military
7
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government functions of SHAEF and the army groups but a policy of
sharp distinction between military government and the army. proper was
initiated. The name of the German Country Unit was changed to United
States Group, Control Council (Germany), it was moved from France to
H6chst am Main, Germany, greatly enlarged, and placed under the com-
mand of Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, United States Army, who was
given the title of Deputy Miliiary Governor.1 7
The Yalta Declaration of February, 1945 and the Berlin Declaration
of June 5, 1945, announced that Germany 'Would be divided into four zones
of occulation, the Soviet forces to occupy the eastern zone, the British forces
the northwestern zone, the American forces the southwestern zone, and the
French forces the western zone. Germany as a whole was to be governed
by a four-power Allied Control Authority at Berlin, the chief organ of which
was to be a Control Council composed of the four tommanders-in-chief in
Germany of the occupying powers. beneath the Control Council there was to
be a Coordinating Committee, consisting of the four deputy commanders-
in-chief, a Secretariat, and twelve directorates, corresponding roughly to the
ministries of a normal national government. The directorates contemplated
were: military; naval; air; reparation, deliveries, and restitution; economic;
finance; transport; man-power; internal affairs arid communications; legal;
political; and prisoners of war and displaced persons. Each of the four
occupying powers was, of course, to be represented on each directorate.
United States Group, Control Council (Germany), by then better known
as U. S. Group C. C., moved from H6chst am Main to Berlin early in August
1945 and the four-power Allied Control Authority for Germany began to
operate during that month. General Eisenhower, as .American commander-
in-chief in Germany, was the American member of the Control Council.
Lieutenant General Clay, as Deputy Military Governor and Commanding
General of U. S. Group C. C., was the American member of the Coordinat-
ing Committee. U. S. Group C. C. had twelve divisions corresponding to
the twelve directorates of the Allied Control Authority and the director
of each division was the American representative on the corresponding
directorate. The directorates in some cases appointed four-power commit-
17. American Organizational Plans for Military Government of Germany,
12 DEP'T STATE BULL. 900 (1945).
[Vol. 13
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tees, whose American members were drawn from the divisions of U. S.
Group C. C.1.8
Initially U. S. Group C. C. was merely the American part of the Allied
Control Authority in Berlin and 'was not responsible for the military govern-
ment of the United States Zone. It gradually 'assumed responsibility for the
government of the zone and by the end of 1945 all of the military government
functions theretofore performed by the civil affairs division of USFET at
Frankfurt am Main had been transferred to it. Incident to this expansion of
function the name of United States Group, Control Council (Germany) was
changed to Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.), commonly
known as OMGUS.
In July 1945 the Honorable Charles Fahy, formerly Solicitor-General
of the United States and more recently Legal Adviser to the Department
of State, arrived in Germany to act as Legal Adviser to the Military Gov-
ernor, Director of the Legal Division, and American'member of the Legal
Directorate, Allied Control Authority." Under Mr. Fahy and his associates
the Legal Division was divided into four branches: Administration of Justice,
which supervised both the military government court system and the Ger-
man courts; Legal Advice, which included legislative drafting; Prisons,
which supervised the German prison system; and War Crimes. The staff of
the division, as organized by Mr. Fahy, was partly military and partly
civilian. It has since become almost wholly civilian.
Although at that time war crimes operations were an exclusively Army
function, conducted under the Theater Judge Advocate, Brigadier General
Edward C. Betts, a career officer of the Judge Advocate General's Depart-
ment who was formerly Professor of Law at the United States Military
Academy, it was recognized that they would involve some four-power prob-
lems and a good deal of cooperation on the part of the military government.
Accordingly, General Betts was made Deputy Director for War Crimes
18. The Crimea Conference, 12 DEP'T STATE BULL. 213, 214 (1945); State-
ment on Control Machinery in Germany, 12 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1054 (1945);
Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany, 12 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1052 (1945),
Map, 13 Id. 275 (1945); see Heneman, American Control Organization in Germany,
6 PUB. ADM. REv. 1 (1946).
19. Mr. Fahy was succeeded in May 1946 by Judge J. Warren Madden of
the United States Court of Claims, formerly Chairman of the National Labor Re-
lations Board and sometime Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh.
Judge Madden was succeeded a few months later by Alvin J. Rockwell, Esq.', for-
merly Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. See, Fahy, The Lawyer
in Military Government of Germany, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 852 (1946).
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of the Legal Division, in addition to his duties as Theater Judge Advocate,
and the work of the War Crimes Branch of the Division was performed under
his supervision.20
IV. Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects. Early in
1945 SHAEF established a Central Registry of War Criminals and Security
Suspects at Paris, staffed by a group of American and British officers and
some 400 French clerks. The original plans for this agency were most
ambitious. It was to maintain machine and finger print records of every
person'in Europe wanted for trial as a war crimihal or as a security suspect
and of every person apprehended by the Allied forces as a prisoner of war
or otherwise. The names of those wanted were secured from the lists pub-
lished by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, from lists of security
suspects compiled by American and British intelligence agencies, and from
individual complaints. Lists of the persons wanted were published and dis-
tributed to all Allied commanders in the West whose troops were appre-
hending prisoners of war or other enemy personnel. This publication of lists
of wanted war criminals was of material value in' the work of apprehending
them. The Central Registry was not so successful in its effort to maintain
records and publish lists of every person taken into custody by the advancing
Allied forces in the West. The advance became so rapid and the number of
prisoners of war taken so great that many of the troop commands were un-
able to report apprehensions promptly to the Central Registry. Even so,
the reports of apprehension reached the Central Registry in such volume
that it could not handle them and eventually had to give up maintaining
records and publishing lists of those apprehended.
After SHAEF was dissolved on July 13, 1945 the Central Registry of
War Criminals and Security Suspects continued as a combined Anglo-
American agency, administered jointly by the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Personnel of USFET and the Deputy Judge Advocate General, British Army
of the Rhine. In September 1945 the British Government proposed that the
Allied Control Council for Germany assume control of the Central Registry.
After considerable delay, occasioned by difficulty in securing agreement by
20. The -planning stage of the work having been completed by then, Gen-
eral Betts withdrew from the position of Deputy Director for War Crimes of the
Legal Division in January 1946 and the position was then abolished. The writer
was Chief of the War Crimes Branch in a military status (Lieutenant Colonel,
Judge Advocate General's Department), 1945-46. He was succeeded by Ben A.
Smith, Esq., of the Texas Bar, formerly an officer of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department, who filled the position in a civilian status.
(Vol. 13
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1948], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/8
1948] PROSECUTION OF GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS 55
the Soviet Government, this proposal was adopted in January 1946 by the
Control Council, which entrusted the immediate supervision of the Central
Registry to a Permanent Commission appointed by the Legal Directorate,
Allied Control Authority.21 At the same time, the Coordinating Committee
decided that the Central Registry should move from Paris to Berlin in the
summer of 1946. The Permanent Commission met at Paris in March 1946
and decided, as a preliminary to the impending move, to discontinue the
keeping of machine and finger print records, the operations relative to secur-
ity suspects, the reception and recording of reports of apprehension, and
the publication of lists of persons apprehended. This reduced.the functions
of the Central Registry to those of maintaining written records of persons
wanted for trial as war criminals and publishing lists of such persons. The
Central Registry was moved to Berlin in the summer of 1946 and the French
clerks replaced by German clerks employed there.
V. Extradition of Alleged War Criniinals.-After World War I- the
chief problem relative to extradition of war criminals which arose was that
created by the Allied attempt to persuade the Dutch Government to sur-
render the former German Emperor for trial. Some fears were expressed
during World War II that the Nazi leaders would be given refuge by neutral
countries. By the end of the summer of 1945, however, it had become ap-
parent that most of the notorious German war criminals were in American
or British custody. In many cases their crimes had been committed in one
or another of the liberated European countries. It will be recalled that the
Moscow Declaration announced that such persons,
"will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds
were done, so that they may be judged and punished according to
the laws of those liberated countries and of the free Governments
which will be erected in them."22
The chief problem this time, therefore, was to devise an orderly proce-
dure for the delivery of identified war criminal suspects to the countries in
which their crimes had been committed. The application of. existing treaties
governing extradition of ordinary criminals to this situation was very doubt-
ful and the procedures prescribed by them unduly cumbersome. Conse-
quently it was decided to establish relatively simple administrative proce-
21. The writer was United States representative on the Permanent Com-
mission. He was succeeded by Mr. Smith. (See preceding note.)
22. Barry, The Moscow Declaration on War Crimes, 17 AusT. L. J. 248(1943).
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dures for the purpose. A plan for the accomplishment of this object was pre-
pared under the supervision of General Betts, acting in his dual capacities
of Theater Judge Advocate and Deputy Director for War Crimes, Legal
Division, U. S. Group C. C., by the War Crimes Branch of the Legal Divi-
sion, working in close collaboration with the International Law Branch,
Office of the Theater Judge Advocate, which was headed by Colonel Charles
Fairman, Judge Advocate General's Department, Professor of Political
Science at Leland Stanford University. The plan was approved by General
Eisenhower and put into operation by two letter directives issued on Sep-
tember 13, 1945 by USFET.
Under this plan, all foreign requests for extradition of alleged war crim-
inals from United States areas of occupation in Germany were to be routed
to the Theater Judge Advocate, who was empowered to order extradition in
ordinary cases after ascertaining that the requested individual was not need-
ed for American purposes or wanted by any country other than that which
made the request. Before acting on a case the Theater Judge Advocate was
to consult the records of the Intelligence Division of Headquarters, United
States Forces, European Theater, and those of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission and the Central Registry of War Criminals and Secur-
ity Suspects. Cases involving important persons, such as general officers
of the German forces, or persons wanted by several countries and cases with
political implications were to be sent to the Legal Division, U. S. Group C. C.,
at Berlin. When such a case was received by the Legal Division it was to
consult with the Directors of Intelligence and Political Affairs, U. S. Group
C. C., and the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Crim-
inality at Nuremberg. In practice, the Theater Judge Advocate delegated
his powers relative to extradition to his Deputy for War Crimes, Colonel
Mickelwait.
Provision for decision in cases where several countries wanted the same
man was made by Article IV of Control Council Law No. 10 which was
drafted by the American Legal Division and adopted by the Allied Control
Council for Germany on December 20, 1945.23 This article lays down prior-
ities to govern certain cases and entrusts the decision to the Legal Director-
ate, Allied Control Authority. In practice the provision worked smoothly
and the interested countries were usually able to settle conflicting claims
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"out of court." For example, if the same German had organized concentration
camps in both France and Czechoslovakia but his activities had been more
notorious in the latter, the French were quite likely to give up their claim
to him on assurance that the Czech Government would bring him to trial
speedily.
On the whole, the extradition plan has worked very well and has enabled
the United States to comply fully with the promises it made in the Moscow
Declaration. Most of the liberated countries seem to be well pleased with the
service rendered them by the American authorities.24
VI. Violations of the Laws and Customs of War.-When SHAEF and
the army group headquarters were dissolved in July 1945 Colonel C. B.
Mickelwait, who had been Staff Judge Advocate of the Twelfth Army Group,
became Deputy Theater Judge Advocate for War Crimes and Chief of the
War Crimes Branch of the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate. This War
Crimes Branch had its headquarters at Wiesbaden, where an extensive war
crimes library, document center and translation bureau was set up. Most of
the liberated countries sent war crimes military missiong to the War Crimes
Branch at Wiesbaden to consult the library and documents and to facilitate
the processing of their governments' requests for extradition. 25 A great
many complaints of war crimes were on hand and one of the first tasks was to
locate all the alleged war criminals among the great masses of Germans
who were in American custody as prisoners of war or otherwise and segregate
them in special war criminal inclosures, where the possibilities of escape or
release by mistake would be at a minimum. At the same time a great net of
war crimes investigating teams, each normally consisting of two officers
and an interpreter, was spread out over Western Germany to locate and
24. The handling of the related problem of repatriation of renegades and
"Quislings," which was done under the same plan, has not met with such universal
approval. In connection with its requests for repatriation of a large number of
followers of General Mihailovitch, t*e Yugoslav Government has objected to the
Anglo-American requirement that such requests be accompanied by statements
of facts constituting treason or war crime. The Yugoslav position was overruled.
by the Assembly of the United Nations by a vote of 40 to 7 on October 31, 1947.
In the course of debate on this problem the Yugoslav foreign minister complained
that only 125 of 2,104 Yugoslav requests for extradition had been granted. New
York Times, Nov. 1, 1947, p. 1.
2S. The Czecho-Slovak mission was headed by General Dr. Bohuslav Eger,
a distinguished international leader of the movement for prosecution of German
war criminals. General Dr. Eger was also the Czecho-Slovak member of the United
Nations War Crimes Commission. This gave the War Crimes Branch at Wiesbaden
a link with the Commission not provided by the American organization itself.
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apprehend alleged war crirhinals not already in custody, to locate and
interrogate witnesses, and to collect documentary evidence.
The military government had set up a system of military tribunals
called military government courts for the trial of Germans for offenses against
the members and directives of the occupying forces. These tribunals were
essentially the traditional American military commission, but appointed,
controlled and their proceedings reviewed by regional directors of military
government rather than Army tactical commanders. A directive issued by
Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, on July 16, 1945
authorized the trial of war criminals by either normal military commissions
or special military government courts, appointed and controlled by the
Army proper (i.e., the tactical forces) their proceedings to be reviewed by
the Theater Judge Advocate. 21 In practice these special military government
courts have usually been used, with some changes from time to time in the
manner of appointment and review. Death sentences and, at times, lesser
sentences, have required confirmation by the Theater Commander. The
rules for these special military government courts have permitted the
reception of any evidence which the court deems of probative value. It has
been suggested that the rules should have been more restrictive, particularly
as to the reception of affidavits in evidence. The writer is not sufficiently
familiar with the actual operation of these tribunals to be able to express an
opinion as to whether the rules have worked unfairly in practice.
The responsibility of the Theater Judge Advocate and his Deputy for
War Crimes for prosecution of war criminals has- been limited to violators
of the laws and customs of war, largely codified in the Hague and Geneva
Conventions. Hence, although many concentration camp and other atrocities
committed in Germany were inflicted upon German victims and had no
connection with the war, the Theater Judge Advocate has been concerned
in prosecuting only those cases involving maltreatment of Allied nationals
incident to the war. Some of the more important cases prosecuted under
the direction of the Deputy Theater Judge Advocate for War Crimes are
familiar, to most Americans. The Dachau and Mauthausen concentration
camp cases involved the perpetration of horrible cruelties on Allied nationals.
26. See United States Law and Practice Concerning Trials of War Criminals
by Military Commissions and Military Government Courts, Annex II to LAw
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Selected and prepared by the United
Nations War Crimes Commission, Vol. I, London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1947;
Nobleman, American Military Government Courts in Germany, 40 AM. J. INTL
L. 803 (1946).
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The Hadamar Insane Asylum case was really one of murder on a wholesale
scale. The Malmedy massacre case involved a typical violation of the laws
of war: cold-blooded shooting of American troops who had surrendered
as prisoners of war and laid down their arms. Buchenwald Concentration
Camp is located in the Soviet Zone of Occupation but the American forces
first overran it and collected a mass of documentary evidence bearing on its
operation. The Soviet government was offered this evidence if it wished to
try the camp leaders but, after some negotiations on the subject; it decided
not to do so, and the case was tried at the War Crimes Trial Center at
Dachau, where the War Crimes Branch erected an inclosure for war crim-
inals, accommodations for willing and unwilling witnesses, and court rooms.
The program of the War Crimes Branch (more recently called War Crimes
Group) of the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate is now in a winding-up
stage and is expected to be completed by July 1, 1948.
One phase of this program involved prosecution and punishment of a
large number of Germans, mostly civilians, who killed or beat members of
Allied bomber crews after they had parachuted to earth. Unquestionably
such killings and beatings were violations of the laws of war because the
crew members, in most *cases, were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war
or wounded and, in any event, members of the civilian populace have no
right to engage in hostilities. Unquestionably also this phase of the war
crimes program had the enthusiastic support of the American public, who
looked upon the killings and beatings as dastardly and cowardly acts. This
attitude was engendered in part, however, by a general belief that our
strategic bombing was more accurate that it has since been shown -to have
been. Moreover, it is now known that the German Government had for-
bidden prosecutions in the German criminal courts for maltreatment of
Allied airmen and had I conducted a propaganda campaign which declared
that the Anglo-American bombing of Germany was in violation of internation-
al law and gave the impression that German civilians would be doing a patriot-
ic act in killing British and American airmen in reprisal. Picture the German
peasant woman whose village has been bombed, her home destroyed and
her children killed, deprived of sleep for weeks by nightly air raids, told by
her government that the raids were unlawful: is it surprising that, if a mem-
ber of a bomber crew parachuted to earth near the ruins of her home, she
hit him with a brick? This may be an extreme case; the point is that some
of thq killings and beatings of Allied airmen, while criminal, were not as
vicious as they seemed to us at the time.
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VII. The Nuremberg Tria.-It will be recalled that the Moscow
Declaration concluded with a statement that it was,
"without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offenses
have no particular goegraphical location, and who will be punished
by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.'27
It is evident that this language was intended to refer to the leaders of
the Nazi regime in Germany who had planned and directed a broad scheme
or system of criminal acts but had not necessarily themselves engaged in
the actual commission of any particular crime. As Lord Wright has aptly
put it,
"War crimes are generally of a mass or multiple character.
At one end are the devisers, organizers, originators, who would in
many cases constitfite a criminal conspiracy; at the bottom end are
the actual perpetrators; in between these extremes are the inter-
mediate links in the chain of crime.' '28
The top Nazis who devised and organized the concentration camp
system committed offenses with "no particular geographical location";
the men who threw living women and children into the furnaces at Auschwitz
were local criminals. As will be seen, the "intermediate links" were the
leaders of the SS and other Nazi organizations.
On May 2, 1945 the President appointed Associate Justice Robert H.
Jackson of the United States Supreme Court,
"to act as the Representative of the United States and as its Chief
of Counsel in preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and
war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers
and their principal agents and accessories as the United States may
agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an
international military tribunal." 29
Mr. Justice Jackson understood his mission as being confined to those
"criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location" referred
to in the Moscow Declaration, and proceeded to negotiate on this basis
with representatives of the British, French and Soviet governments. 0 These
27. Barry, The Moscow Declaration on War Crimes, 17 AusT. L. J. 248
(1943).
28. Rt. Hon. Lord Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, 62 L. Q.
REv. 40, 46 (1946).29. Ex. Order No. 9547, May 2, 1945; 10 FED. REG. 4961; 3 CODE FED. REos.
64 (Supp. 1945).
30. Justice Jackson's Report to President Truman on the Legal Basis for Trial
of War Criminals, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 144 (1945).
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negotiations resulted in the signing of the London Agreement of August 8,
1945, to which was annexed the charter of the contemplated International
Military Tribunal.3 1 Article 1 of the Agreement provided that,
"There shall be established, after consultation with the Control
Council for Germany, an International Military Tribunal for -the
trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical
location,'* * *."
Curiously, the Charter made no mention of consultation with the
Control Council and contained no restriction to "criminals whose offenses
have no particular geographical location", referring instead to "major war
criminals of the European Axis.' It provided for a four-member tribunal,
each member to have an alternate, one member and his alternate to be
appointed by each of the signatory powers, prescribed its jurisdiction and
procedure, and provided that,
"In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accordance
with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may at
any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences but may not in-
crease the severity thereof.13 2
The jurisdictional provisions of Article 6 of the Charter are of great
importance. The most significant follow:
"(a) Crimes against peace, Namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the foregoing,
"(b) War Crimes. Namely, violations of the laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity.
"(c) Crimes against humanity. Namely, murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population before or during the war or persecu-
tions on political racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
31. Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal,
13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 222 (1945); 19 TEMP. L. Q. 160, 162 (1945).
32. Article 29.
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connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated."
It will be evident at once that the categories "Crimes against peace"
and "Crimes against humanity" go beyond the traditional concepts of the
laws and customs of war. Some controversy and a considerable literature
have arisen over whether the provisions for punishment of individuals for
these offenses, particularly crimes against the peace, are ex post factops
It is not my purpose to discuss that question here. The fact that it has been
seriously raised, however, indicates that Mr. Justice Jackson was somewhat
over-enthusiastic in saying that,
"We propose to punish acts which have been regarded as criminal
since the time of Cain and have been so written in every civilized
code."34
The Tribunal contemplated by the London Agreement was duly
appointed, with the Honorable Francis Biddle, formerly Attorney General
of the United States, as the American member and United States Circuit
Judge John J. Parker as his alternate.35 In accordance with Article 22 of the
Charter it held its first meeting at Berlin in October 1945 and there received
an indictment against twenty-four men who had been leaders in Nazi
Germany.36 The Tribunal then moved to Nuremberg and proceeded to the
trial of twenty-two of the defendants, two having died in the interim. The
trial lasted from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946. All of the de-
fendants were charged with conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace;
eight were found guilty.3 7 Sixteen of the defendants were charged with the
33. See, for example, Mr. Justice Birkett, International Legal Theories Evolved
at Nuremberg, 23 INT'L AFF. 317 (1947) Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and Inter-
national Law, 41 AM. J. IT'eL L. 20 (1947); Glueck, The Nuernberg Trial and
Aggressive War, 59 HAIv. L. REV. 396 (1946); Lauer, The International War
Criminal Trials and the Common Law of Wai, 20 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 18 (1945);
Lord Justice Lawrence, The Nuremberg Trial, 23 INT'L AnF. 151 (1947); Lord
Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, 62 L. Q. Rnv. 46 (1946); Q. Wright,
The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947). In this and other
respects the Charter is not in accord with the American views presented to the
Peace Conference in 1919, Annex II to Report of the Commission on Responsibil-
ity, etc., 14 AM. J. ID"L L. 95, 142 (1920).'
34. Justice Jackson's Report to President Truman on the Legal Basis, For.
Trial of War Criminals, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 144, 151 (1945).
35. 13 .DEP'T STATE BULL. 404 (1945).
36. Indictment against Major Nazi War Criminals, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 172
(1945).
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actual commission of crimes against the peace; twelve were found guilty38
Eighteen of the defendants were charged with war crimes; sixteen were found
guilty.39 Eighteen of the defendants were charged with crimes against
humanity; sixteen were found guilty.40 The sentences were put into execu-
tion by a four power commission established by the Control Council for the
purpose.
From an organizational standpoint it is striking that, although the four
powers had set up an Allied Control Authority to be the central government
of Germany, neither the International Military Tribunal not its prosecution
staff, organized, as they were, to try Germans on German soil, were subject
to the Allied Control Authority. The American members of the Tribunal
and Mr. Justice Jackson were completely independent of both the American
military government and the army proper. General Clay objected to this
arrangement from the beginning and it proved to have serious disadvantages.
Army morale was impaired when members of Mr. Justice Jackson's staff
were permitted to bring their wives to Europe at a time when persons in
the Army who had been there much longer and were much more deserving
of the privilege were denied it. Pay scales were not uniform. Much worse
than, that, although there were Mr. Justice Jackson to manage the prosecu-
tion and Mr. Biddle and Judge Parker to sit in judgment, no American
except the President himself had any right or duty to plan and make ar-
rangements for the entire enterprise. The Charter of the Tribunal required
it to hold its first meeting in Berlin and, as the Allied Control Authority
Building is in the American sector of the city, it was clearly an American
obligation to make the necessary arrangements. Mr. Justice Jackson did
not make them and Mr. Biddle was in no position to do so. There are no
hotels or restaurants open to Americans in post-war Berlin, so the Tribunal
and the prosecution staff might have found themselves in a difficult position
if Mr. Fahy had not foreseen the problem and used the staff of the Legal
Division of OMGUS to make the arrangements. When the Tribunal moved
from Perlin to Nuremberg, after receiving the indictment, it found an
38. Those listed in the preceding note and Frick, Funk, Doenitz and Seyss-
Inquart.
39. Hess and Fritzsche were found not guilty; Streicher, Schacht, von
Schirach and von Papen were not charged with war crimes.
40. Hess and Fritsche were found not guilty; Schacht, Doenitz, Raeder and
von Papen were not charged with crimes against humanity. International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sententes, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 272-332,
333 (1947); Leventhal, et al., The Nuernberg Verdict, 60 HARv. L. REv. 857, 907(1947).
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American prosecution staff of some 650 hard at work but no arrangements
made to secure counsel for the defense. Judge Parker asked Mr. Fahy for
assistance and the Legal Division undertook the burden of securing counsel
for the defense, keeping several of its members at Nuremberg for the
purpose. The Legal Division also secured and transported to Nuremberg
most of the witnesses and documentary evidence required by the defense.41
It did a good deal of the work connected with the printing and distribution
of'the public notices issued by the Tribunal in connection with the trial of
allegedly criminal organizations. Eventually the Army had to provide the
Tribunal with most of its Secretariat and to set up a special command at
Nuremberg to handle supply and administrative problems incident to the
trial.
VIII. Crimes against the Peace and against Humanity.-Until Sep-
tember 1945 the American Army and military government in Germany had
no concern with any crimes committed by Germans except violations of
military government law and violations of the laws and customs of war.
The former were handled by the military government court system, the
latter by the Deputy Theater Judge Advocate for War Crimes. In that
month the Theater Commander received a directive from the American
Joint Chiefs of Staff which required him to investigate and prosecute not
only offenses against the laws and customs of war but also crimes against
the peace and crimes against humanity, describing those offenses substanti-
ally as they were defined in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal. 42 Moreover, the new directive extended these concepts, as the
41. The Legal Division, Control Commission for Germany (British Ele-
ment), British counterpart of the American Legal Division, cooperated fully in
these activities. Negotiations with the prisoners were conducted by a British
officer,'Lieutenant-Colonel Neave. See, Fahy, The Lawyer in Military Government
of Germany, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 852 (1946). The trial judge advocate (prose-
cuting officer) of a court-martial or military commission is charged with the duty
of securing witnesses and depositions for the defense. Par. 97, Manual for Courts-
Martial, U. S. Army, 1928.
42. JCS 1023/10; The provisions of this directive broadening the concept of
war crimes were foreshadowed in part by paragraphs 4c and Sa of the Directive
to the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation Regarding
the Military Government of Germany, issued in April 1945 (JCS 1067; 13 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 596, 598 (1945)) and by paragraph 5, Part III, of the Potsdam Agree-
ment of July 25, 1945 (Report of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, 13 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 153, 155 (1945)). They came as a surprise to the Army and military
government authorities in Germany, however, because the draft of a similar direc-
tive on war crimes whiclh was prepared by the European Advisory Commission and
which, it was anticipated, would be adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
limited to the traditional laws and customs of war.
I I
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Charter had not, to offenders whose crimes were merely local in character
and did not limit the cpncept of crimes against humanity to those incident
to crimes against the peace or war crimes, as the Charter had done. This
raised serious questions. Mr. Justice Jackson could argue understandably
that Reichsmarshal Goering and Field Marshal Keitel were guilty of a crime
against the peace in "waging of a war of aggression."- Did the Joint Chiefs
of Staff mean to say that Leutnant Schwarz and Gefreiter Schmid were
also criminals, merely because they participated in the "waging of a war of
aggression" by fighting with their platoon?
The directive also contained provisions as to extradition of war crim-
inals which were consistent with the plan already adopted, included the
London Agreement as part of the instructions governing our forces in Europe,
and directed the Theater Commander to seek Control Council agreement
to the policies which it prescribed. In compliance with this last requirement,
the Legal Division of OMGUS prepared a draft law for submission to the
Control Council. After approval by the Legal Directorate and the Coordina-
ting Committee the law was enacted by the Control Council, with minor
changes, in December 1945. 48 This law made the London Agreement, the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, and the provisions of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff directive declaring the punishability of crimes against
the peace and crimes against humanity, part of the law of Germany. It also
made provision, as noted before, for settling disputes between several
countries requesting extradition of the same alleged war criminal.
Responsibility for making arrangements to carry out the provisions of
the new directive requiring investigation and prosecution of local crimes
against the peace and against humanity was imposed by the Theater Com-
mander upon General Betts in his dual capacities of Theater Judge Advocate
and Deputy Director for War Crimes of the Legal Division. General Betts
was also concerned with another problem created by the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal and the new Joint Chiefs of Staff directive.
Both contemplated that the criminality of organizations as well as that of
individuals would be tried by the International Military Tribunal. If the
Tribunal determined that an organization was criminal, its individual
members were to be tried before "national, military or occupation courts,"
which would treat the determinatiori as to criminality of the organization
43. Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 862
(1946). The text of the law is printed in full at the end of this article.
21
Fratcher: Fratcher: American Organization for Prosecution
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
as proved and not subject to question.44 Six organizations were included in
the Nuremberg indictment and.some of them were so large that it would
be a tremendous undertaking to bring all their members to trial.41 One of
the indicted organizations alone, the Leadership Corps of the National
Socialist Party, had a membership of some 2,000,000.4 General Betts
discharged the responsibility so imposed upon him by preparing a plan
for handling crimes against the peace and against humanity and membership
in criminal organizations, evolved through conferences with General Clay,
Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Fahy, with the assistance of the Legal Division
of OMGUS and the International Law Branch, Office of the Theater Judge
Advocate. The completed plan was approved by the Theater Commander
on December 5, 1945.
The plan made no change in the functions of the Theater Judge Advo-
cate and his Deputy for War Crimes with respect to extradition and to trials
for violations of'the laws and customs of war, including concentration camp
and related atrocities against Allied nationals which were incident to the
war. Thus the Army proper, as represented by the Judge Advocate General's
Department, retained its traditional responsibility for enforcement of the
laws and customs of war but did not assume any responsibility for prosa'ut-
ing crimes against the peace, crimes against humanity or membership in
criminal organizations.
The plan provided for the continuation of Mr. Justice Jackson's prose-
cution staff after the completion of the first Nuremberg trial, for the purpose
of prosecuting important crimes against the peace and against humanity and
leaders of the criminal organizations in international tribunals or, if no
agreement with the other occupying powers for further international trials
should be reached, in special United States military government courts to
be appointed for the purpose. To facilitate this continued effort, Mr. Justice
Jackson was to appoint a Deputy Chief of Counsel for Subsequent Proceed-
ings, who would begin at once preparing for the later trials. Upon the
resignation of Mr. Justice Jackson, his organization was to become subject
to OMGUS and his successor was to be appointed by the Military Governor
(i.e. the Theater Con-fmander, who heads both the tactical forces and the
44. Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter.
45. Indictment against Major Nazi War Criminals, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 172
(1945); Leventhal, et al., The Nuernberg Verdict, 60 HARV. L. REV. 857, 887-902
(1947).
46. Ibid., iiote 137.
(Vol. 13
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military government). General Betts carried this phase of the plan to
Washington and it was approved by the President on January 16, 194647
Mr. Justice Jackson appointed Colonel Telford Taylor, formerly General
Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission, as his Deputy for
Subsequent Proceedings and Colonel Taylor was promoted to brigadier
general to give him a grade appropriate to his position. Mr. Justice Jackson
resigned as United States Chief of Counsel after the completion of the
first Nuremberg trial and the Military Governor appointed General Taylor
to succeed him. No further international trials have been conducted by
the Nuremberg organization. Its chief interest has been in prosecuting
leading German industrialists for ckimes against the peace consisting of
their support of the launching of wars of aggression. It was recently an-
nounced that the program would be largely completed by the end of
1947 and entirely finished by June 30, 1948. Untried cases on hand are to
be turned over to the German courts for trial.
The plan evolved by General Betts provided for the trial of those
crimes against humanity which were offenses against the local German
law, where the victims were Germans or other non-United Nations na-
tionals, by the German courts, under military government supervision.
Appropriate action to enable the German courts to discharge this respon-
sibility was directed by a Theater Staff Memorandum of December 15,
1945. By this time the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany had
been divided into three laender or states, Bavaria, Wurttemberg-Baden
and Greater Hesse, each with a German ministry and legislature, super-
vised by an American Office of Military Government. The members of
the three ministries met together for consultation at Stuttgart in an organ-
ization called the Laenderrat, which was organized and supervised by
Professor James K. Pollock, Chairman of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Michigan. In the initial stages of the occupa-
tion, legislation affecting the German populace which was desired by our
forces was promulgated directly by American military orders. By December
1945 the procedure was to submit proposed drafts of the desired legislation
to the Laenderrat, which was free to discuss them and suggest changes.
After this, the legislation was enacted by the legislatures of the three
47. Ex. Order No. 9679, Jan. 16, 1946, 11 FED. REG. 703; 3 CODE FED. REGS.
86 (Supp. 1946) and see Ex. Order No. 9813, Dec. 20, 1946, 11 FED. REG. 14607;
3 CODE FED. REGS. 187 (Supp. 1946). See Mr. Justice Jackson's Final Report to the-
President, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 771, 773 (1946).
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laender and became part of the ordinary German law, enforcible by the
German courts the same as any other German law. Accordingly, to carry
out the instructions in the Theater Staff Memorandum it was incumbent
upon the Legal Division of OMGUS to draft a proposed law for submission
to the Laenderrat. 1
I It soon became apparent that there was a difference of opinion within
the Legal Division itself as to the proper scope of the law. Most of the
staff felt that the law should merely authorize the German courts to try
Germans for acts which were crimes against local German law at the time
they were committed. Such a law would only eliminate such defenses as the
statute of limitations and Nazi pardons and amnesties, thus enabling
the courts to try such offenses as burning synagogues (arson), and killing
and beating Jews (murder and assault and battery), which were clearly
crimes under the German Criminal Code before and during the Nazi regime.
It was suggested, on the other hand, that the new law should authorize the
German courts to punish acts which were not crimes under German law
when they were committed but, perhaps, should have been. The acts in
question were those of informing the Nazi authorities of the status or of-
fenses of an individual, where such information led to persecution of that
individual. In the Soviet Zone of Occupation the German courts, acting
under Control Council Law No. 10, were permitted to punish a German
for informing the police, during the Nazi regime, that his neighbor was a
Communist, an act which was not only not a crime at the time but may
have appeared to him to be'a patriotic duty. Should we permit German
courts in our zone to do so? 48 The law as finally drafted in the Legal
Division did not. It merely lifted the bar of the statute of limitations, made
unavaiHable as defenses Nazi pardons arid amnesties, and permitted the
reopening of old cases. Even then the Laenderrat was fearful that it might
be given an ex post facto interpretation and suggested amendments to
ensure that it was not. These amendments were accepted by the military
government, the law was passed by the legislatures of the three laender,
and it received the approval of the Deputy Military Governor in May 1946.
48. The controversy involved, in part, interpretation of Section 2, Article 'If,
of Control Council Proclamation No. 3, "Fundamental Principles of Judicial Re-
form," which provided, "Criminal responsibility shall be determined only for
offences provided by law." It was argued that this provision did not prohibit ex
post facto legislation. The entire proclamation is printed at the end of this article.
Control Council Law No. 10, which is also printed at the end of this article, should
be read in the light of the proclamation.
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It was apparent that General Taylor's organization at Nuremberg
could not try all-the members of the organizations which the International
Military Tribunal declared criminal and the plan evolved by General
Betts contemplated that those who were not tried by the Nuremberg
organization would be handled by the Denazification System, which was
then being planned in OMGUS by a Board of which Mr. Fahy was chairman.
This Denazification System, which was put into effect by a uniform Law
for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, enacted by the
legislatures of the three laender in the American Zone on March 5, 1946,49
called for hearings before administrative tribunals composed of Germans
acting under American military government supervision. In essence it is a
system of quarantine, rather than of penal sanctions, designed to keep
the leaders of the National Socialist movement in custody and limit the
activities of its more active adherents long enough to permit the democratic
forces to gain firm and effective control of the German political structure
and economy. That a German belonged to an organization which the
International Military Tribunal declared criminal is not necessarily given
any weight or effect by a German denazification tribunal. This solution of
the organization problem, therefore, does not carry out the intention of
Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
which contemplated that the members of organizations declared criminal
would, from that fact alone, be treated and punished as criminals. The
International Military Tribunal declared parts of three of the six indicted
organizations criminal,r ° with the qualification that criminality would not
attach to an individual member unless he joined voluntarily and knew of
the organization's criminal objects or participated in its criminal activities.
The International Military Tribunal and the prosecution staff devoted a
great deal of time and effort to this organization problem. They were
largely wasted, except to the extent that the record made of the activities
of the organizations will be of permanent historical value. It has been
suggsted that this failure to carry out Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal was due to deficiences in Control
Council Law No. 10 and to these qualifications added by the Tribunal to
49. See Fahy, The Lawyer in Military Government of Germany, 15 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 852, 858 (1946). See also, Control Council Directive No. 38, Oct. 12,
1946.
50. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS and the Gestapo, Inter-
national Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J.
INr'L L. 172, 249-272 (1947).
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its declaration of criminality.5 It may well be asked whether the plan
proposed by the Charter was not unworkable in practice and whether the
provisions of both the Charter and Law No. 10 might not have been better
if Mr. Justice Jackson's organization, which drafted the Charter, instead
of being independent, had been an integral part of the Army-Military
Government team in Germany.
IX. Conclusion. It is too early to evaluate the results of the Amer-
ican war crimes program in Germany. The organizational structure which
was erected to carry it out displayed in its inception a number of independ-
ent agencies with poorly-defined and overlapping jurisdictions and without
a single common goal. Although some of these agencies, such as Colonel
Mickelwait's large and important one, were well organized within them-
selves, there was a distinct lack of authoritative cooraination between the
agencies. The existence of the war crimes problem was foreseen before the
United States entered the war; the lack of a unified organization to meet
it must be attributed to a lack of high-level planning in Washington. The
coordination and unity of purpose which were eventually attained were
due almost wholly to the disinterested cooperation of Mr. Fahy and the
selfless, devoted work of General Betts. General Betts died in May 1946,
worn out after four exhausting years as the chief legal officer of the Amer-
ican forces in Europe.52 His country owes him a debt of gratitude for a
great public service.
51. Leventhal, et al., The Nuernberg Verdict, 60 HARv. L. REv. 857, 893-894,
899, 902 (1947). Sir Norman Birkett, the British Alternate Member on the
International Military Tribunal, appears to feel, as the present writer does, that
Articles 9"and 10 of the Charter, if carried into execution, would have worked an
injustice. Mr. Justice Birkett, International Legal Theories Evolved at Nitrem-
berg, 23 INr'L AVF. 317, 325 (1947).
52. He was succeeded as Theater Judge Advocate by Colonel Mickelwait,
whose position of Deputy Theater Judge Advocate for War Crimes was taken by
Colonel Clio E. Straight, a graduate of the State University of Iowa College of
Law and a career officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department.
(Vol. 13
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APPENDIX
CONTROL COUNCIL PROCLAMATION No. 3
Fundamental Principles of Judicial Reform
By the elimination of the Hitler tyranny by the Allied Powers, the
terrorist system of Nazi Courts has been liquidated. It is necessary to
establish a new democratic judicial system based on the achievements of
democracy, civilization and justice. The Control Council therefore pro-
claims the following fundamental principles of judicial reform which shall
be applied throughout Germany.
I
Equality Before tke Law
All persons are equal before the law. No person, whatever his race,
nationality or religion, shall be deprived of his legal rights.
II
Guaranties of the Riglts of the Accused
1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
2. Criminal responsibility shall be determined only for offences pro-
vided by law.
3. Determination by any court of any crime "by analogy" or by so-
called "sound popular instinct," as heretofore provided in the German
Criminal Code, is prohibited.
4. In any criminal prosecution the accused shall have the rights recog-
nized by democratic law, namely the right to a speedy and public trial nd
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, the right to be
confronted with witnesses against him and to have process for obtaining
the witnesses in his favor and the right to have the assistance of counsel for
his defence. Excessive or inhuman punishments or any not provided by
law will not be inflicted.
5. Sentences on persons convicted under the Hitler Regime on politi-
cal, racial or religious grounds must be quashed.
III
Liquidation of Extraordinary Hitler Courts
The People's Court, Courts of the N.S.D.A.P. and Special Courts are
abolished and their re-establishment prohibited.
IV
Independence of the Judiciary
1. Judges will be independent from executive control when exercising
their functions and owe obedience only to the law.
2. Access to judicial functions will be open to all who accept democratic
principles without account of their race, social origin or religion. The pro-
motion of judges will be based solely on merit and legal qualifications.
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Justice will be administered in Germany in accordance with the prin-
ciples of this proclamation by a system of Ordinary German Courts.




General of the Army
G. ZHUKOV




CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity
In order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow ]eclaration of 30
October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter
issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal basis in
Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders,
other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal, the
Control Council enacts as follows:
Article I
The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 "Concerning Responsi-
bility of Hitlerites for Committed Atrocities" and the London Agreement
of 8 August 1945 "Concerning Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis" are made integral parts of this Law. Ad-
herence to the provisions of the London Agreement by any of the United
Nations, as provided for in Article V of that Agreement, shall'not entitle
such 'Nation to participate or interfere in the operation of this Law within
the Control Council area of authority in Germany.
Article 11
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
(a) Crimes Against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries
and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, includ-
ing but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of
aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or as-
surances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing.
* (b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property
constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not
limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill
teatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes Against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including. but
not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprison-
(Vol. 13
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ment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether
or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization de-
clared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.
2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which
he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of
this Article, if he (a) was a priricipal or (b) was an accessory to the com-
mission 'of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a
consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises in-
volving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group
connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to
paragraph 1(a), if he held a high political, civil or military (including
General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents
or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic
life of any such country.
3. Any person found guilty of any of the Crimes above mentioned may
upon conviction be punished as shall be determined by the tribunal to be
just. Such punishment may consist of one or more of the following:
(a) Death.
(b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without hard
labour.
c) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labour, in lieu thereof.
Forfeiture of property.
(e) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired.
(f) Deprivation of some or all civil rights.
Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is
ordered by the Tribunal shall be delivered to the Control Council for Ger-
many, which shall decide on its disposal.
4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State
or as a responsible official in a Government Department, does not free him
from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment.
(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Gov-
ernment or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime,
but may be considered in mitigation..
5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused
shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect
of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945, nor shall any immunity,
pardon or amnesty granted under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to
trial or punishment.
Article III
1. Each occupying authority, within its Zone of occupation,
(a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected
of having committed a crime, including those charged with crime by one of
the United Nations, to be arrested and shall take under control the property,
real and personal, owned or controlled by the said persons, pending decisions
as to its eventual disposition.
(b) shall report to the Legal Directorate the names of all suspected
criminals, the reasons for and the places of their detention, if they are
detained, and the names and location of witnesses.
(c) shall take appropriate measures to see that witnesses and evidence
will be available when required.
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(d) shall have the right to cause all persons so arrested and charged,
and not delivered to another authority as herein provided, or released, to
be brought to trial before an appropriate tribunal. Such tribunal may, in
the case of crimes committed by persons of German citizenship or nation-
ality against other persons of German citizenship or nationality, or stateless
persons, be a German Court, if authorized by the occupying authorities.1 2. The tribunal by which persons charged with offenses hereunder
shall be tried and* the rules and procedure thereof shall be determined or
designated by each Zone Commander for his respective Zone. Nothing
herein is intended to, or shall impair or limit the jurisdiction or power of
any court or tribunal now or hereafter established in any Zone by the
Commander thereof, or of the International Military Tribunal established
by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.
3. Persons wanted for trial by an International Military Tribunal will
not be tried without the consent of the Committee of Chief Prosecutors.
Each Zone Commander will deliver such persons who are within his Zone
to that committee upon request and will make witnesses and evidence
available to it.
4. Persons known to be wanted for trial in another Zone or outside
Germany will not be tried prior to decision under Article IV unless the fact
of their apprehension has been reported in accordance with Section 1(b)
of this Article, three months have elapsed thereafter, and no request for
delivery of the type contemplated by Article IV has been received by the
Zone Commander concerned.
5. The execution of death sentences may be deferred by not to exceed
one month after the sentence has become final when the Zone Commander
concerned has reason to believe that the testimony of those under sentence
would be of value in the investigation and trial of crimes within or without
his Zone.
6. Each Zone Commander will cause such effect to be given to the
judgments of courts of conpetent jurisdiction, with respect to the property
taken under his control pursuant hereto, as he may deem proper in the
interest of justice.
Article IV
1. When any person in a Zone in Germany is alleged to have com-
mitted a crime, as defined in Artile II, in a country other than Germany or
in another Zone, the government of that nation or the Commander of the
latter Zone, as the case may be, may request the Commander of the Zone
in which the person is located for his arrest and delivery for trial to the
country or Zone in which the crime was committed. Such request for de-
livery shall be granted by the Commander receiving it unless he believes
such person is wanted for trial or as a witness by an International Military
Tribunal, or in Germany, or in a nation other than the one making the
request, or the Commander is not satisfied that delivery should be made,
in any of which cases he shall have the right to forward the said request to
the Legal Directorate of the Allied Control Authority. A similar procedure
shall apply to witnesses, material exhibits and other forms of evidence.
2. The Legal Directorate shall consider all requests referred to it, and
shall determine the same in accordance with the following principles, its
determination to be communicated to the Zone Commander.
(a) A person wanted for trial or as a witness by an International Mili-
tary Tribunal shall not be delivered for trial or required to give evidence
(Vol. 13
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outside Germany, as the case may be, except upon approval by the Com-
mittee of Chief Prosecutors acting under the London Agreement of 8
August 1945.
(b) A person wanted for trial by several authorities (other than an
International Military Tribunal) shall be disposed of in accordance with
the following priorities:
(1) If wanted for trial in the Zone in which lie is, he should not be
delivered unless arrangements are made for his return after trial elsewhere;
(2) If wanted for trial in a -Zone other than that in which he is, he
should be delivered to that Zone in preference to delivery outside Germany
unless arrangements are made for his return to that Zone after trial else-
where;
(3) If wanted for trial outside Germany by two or more of the United
Nations, of one of which he is a citizen, that one should have.priority;
(4) If wanted for trial outside Germany by several countries, not all
of which are United Nations, United Nations should have priority;
(5) If wanted for trial outside Germany bjr two or more of the
United Nations, then, subject to Article IV 2(b) (3) above, that which has
the most serious charges against him, which are moreover supported by
evidence, should have priority.
Article V
The delivery, under Article IV of this Law, of persons for trial shall be
made on demands of the Governments or Zone Commanders in such a
manner that the delivery of criminals to one jurisdiction will not become
the means of defeating or unnecessarily delaying the carrying out of justice
in another place. If within six months the delivered person has not been
convicted by the Court of the Zone or country to which he has been de-
livered, then such person shall be returned upon demand of the Commander
of the Zone where the person was located prior to delivery.
Done at Berlin, 20 Decmeber 1945.
JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY
General, U. S. Army
SIR BERNARD L. MONTGOMERY
Field Marshal
Louis KOELTL




Marshal of the Soviet Union
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